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Abstract. This paper focuses on the semiotic foundations of sociolinguistics. 
Starting from the definition of “sociolinguistics” given by the philosopher Adam 
Schaff, the paper examines in particular the notion of “critical sociolinguistics” as 
theorized by the Italian semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. The basis of the social 
dimension of language are to be found in what Rossi-Landi calls “social 
reproduction” which regards both verbal and non-verbal signs. Saussure’s notion 
of langue can be considered in this way, with reference not only to his Course of 
General Linguistics, but also to his Harvard Manuscripts.  
The paper goes on trying also to understand Roland Barthes’s provocative 
definition of semiology as a part of linguistics (and not vice-versa) as well as 
developing the notion of communication-production in this perspective. Some 
articles of Roman Jakobson of the sixties allow us to reflect in a manner which we 
now call “socio-semiotic” on the processes of transformation of the “organic” 
signs into signs of a new type, which articulate the relationship between organic 
and instrumental. In this sense, socio-linguistics is intended as being socio-
semiotics, without prejudice to the fact that the reference area must be human, 
since semiotics also has the prerogative of referring to the world of non-human 
vital signs.  
Socio-linguistics as socio-semiotics assumes the role of a “frontier” science, in 
the dual sense that it is not only on the border between science of language and 
the anthropological and social sciences, but also that it can be constructed in a 
movement of continual “crossing frontiers” and of “contamination” between 




1. Critical sociolinguistics 
 
In one chapter of his Saggi Filosofici (Philosophical Essays), the Italian 
version of which is edited by Augusto Ponzio (Schaff 1978: 121–139; 
now in Schaff 2003), Adam Schaff proposes a method for founding the 
discipline called “sociolinguistics”. At the time in which the essay was 
written this discipline was still considered a “young” field of research, 
at least in its independent determination in comparison with the other 
sciences of the language. Schaff starts off from the very term “socio-
linguistics”, which was a neologism at that time, to consider the two 
components, the “social” and the “linguistic”, connected by — what he 
calls — a “reciprocal relation” (Schaff 1978: 123). Talking about 
reciprocity eliminates any alleged separation often implicit in expres-
sions like “language and society” that assume the separate existence of 
a language without society or of a society without language, the 
existence of a language before society, or vice versa. Schaff says that 
this is certainly not a new problem, if we consider that these aspects 
were studied long before the denomination “sociolinguistics” opened 
the way for setting up an independent field of research. 
Schaff divides this reciprocity into two perspectives corresponding to 
the goal and the competence of sociolinguistics: “A) Influence of lan-
guage on society; B) Influence of society on language” (Schaff 1978: 123). 
At this point, it is necessary to make a clarification that is not of 
only terminological value. It is well-known that in many languages 
including German (and Schaff writes his essay in German), there is 
only one word to define both Italian words lingua and linguaggio, 
whereas in other languages, the difference between the two words 
(‘lingua’ and ‘linguaggio’) permits a better expression and comprehen-
sion of the relative conceptual differences1. ‘Linguaggio’ is the speci-
fically human modelling device, preceding the need for communi-
cation and objectified in products consisting of verbal and non-verbal 
                                                 
1   The Italian terms ‘linguaggio’ and ‘lingua’ have been translated using the word 
‘language’ but where it is necessary to distinguish one from the other, the Italian 
term has been left in Italian between inverted commas (Translators’ note). 
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signs; whereas ‘lingua’ is the result of this modelling in the field of 
verbal signs (see Ponzio 2002: 54–55). We may add to these definitions 
that, as Rossi-Landi claims, ‘linguaggio’ consists of “lingua in addition 
to common speech”, that is to say natural language within the frame-
work of all those common interlinguistic techniques by virtue of 
which it is possible to understand and translate (Rossi-Landi 1980 
[1968]). Therefore, when Schaff employs the term ‘die Sprache’, it is 
necessary to consider the different ideas, which come between the two 
corresponding terms in Italian.  
As for point A), the influence of language on the society, Schaff 
writes: 
 
Language is born from society especially as a resonance to man’s need to 
communicate; in this sense it is a social product, a product of the social 
cohabitation of men. But, once it is born, language starts to exert an 
effect on social life and this occurs in different ways (Schaff 1978: 124)2. 
 
On the one hand there is the problem of how thought and human 
knowledge are linguistically forged — here we can use the term 
“language” — that is, we could also say “are forged in the language”. 
Schaff calls it “linguistic noetics”. On the other hand there is, however, 
a field of research which concerns the influence of language on human 
activity, which Schaff calls “pragmalinguistics”.  
Not all scholars accepted that “the social” assumes central im-
portance in the first of the two issues. In fact, for many scholars the 
way how thought and human knowledge get linguistically forged, is a 
question concerning individual factors. As an example we can quote 
venerable Chomsky, who denies value to a science called “socio-
linguistics” since in his generative grammar the innate structures in 
human beings make language possible both as competence and 
performance. Another example would be the articulated trends which 
deal with the “mind-body” problem from the neurobiological perspec-
tives. According to Schaff, however, the linguistic noetics concerns the 
                                                 
2   Schaff’s quotes come from the Italian translation of his book. The English 
version is from the translator of the present article. 
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social aspect, since we are “concrete subjects in the knowledge 
process” (Schaff 1978: 124) and not isolated individuals, “we always 
think with the help of and within the framework of a specific 
language” which represents “the necessary means of knowledge of 
social order” (Schaff 1978: 124). Here the term “lingua” is rightly used 
but the deliberate ambiguity with the more general term “linguaggio” 
is by no means out of place, since Schaff’s positions are critical both 
towards the innate Chomskyan universalism and the extreme relati-
vistic theory, which insists that human thought is completely sub-
merged in natural language so that it is influenced by the natural lan-
guage according to a differential influx. According to Schaff, socio-
linguistics receives “one of the constitutional elements of its true field 
of scientific competence” from the specific problems of the linguistic 
noetics，as well as its “concrete tasks of research” (Schaff 1978: 130). 
Twenty-five years after the publication of the Polish philosopher’s 
essay, we can still say that these tasks are related to the fact that we 
“think linguistically”, in the dual and complex sense that we think in 
language, but this language is the (social) product of the activity that 
we call “linguaggio” which models the human world as a social world 
in its innate principles. We may also say: we think inter-linguistically, 
the mother tongue itself is multilingual, in the sense that our entry to 
“linguaggio” through “lingua”, our abandoning the infant condition, 
already assumes sociality and plurality of signs of which “linguaggio” is 
made up (not only verbal ones). 
As we have said, “pragmalinguistics” concerns the influence of 
language on human activity” (Schaff 1978: 130). According to Schaff, a 
very important component of this field of research and the work of 
sociolinguistics is represented by the analysis of the influx of language 
on stereotypes, a topic which Schaff later developed in his book 
entitled Stereotypes and human behaviour (Schaff 1987). It is very 
significant that this element of analysis is contemplated within the 
framework of what we may rightly define “critical sociolinguistics”, 
that is the sociolinguistics whose tasks include analysing and making 
generally understood the role of linguistic manipulation, not only for 
speculative reasons but for overall social behaviour. Stereotypes always 
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imply an emotional component, induce social behaviour, and produce 
value systems and ideologies (Schaff 1978: 134). In this regards, 
sociolinguistics may formulate questions like: “How do value systems 
existing in society change? How do they react in the sphere of social 
activity? How are they connected to the behaviour of socially active 
men?” (Schaff 1978: 135). These questions lay the precise basis for a 
science of language as human science in a “critical” sense. 
As for the influence of society on language, according to Schaff, it 
may be well summarised by the definition of Hymes, one of the 
“fathers” of sociolinguistics, who claims that sociolinguistics must be 
considered as “the means of speech in human communities, and their 
meaning to those who use them” (Hymes 1974). 
This perspective considers sociolinguistics not as a static “photo-
graph” of the states of the language in relation to the social collocation 
of the speakers, but as a discipline respectful of language as a socio-
cultural process. Schaff intuitively knows, for instance, that at the period 
in which he wrote this text, an absolutely essential task of sociolinguistic 
research was to consider “the linguistic variations in developing 
Countries” (Schaff 1978: 136). Naturally, the notion of development 
denotes a “linear” and probably a too optimistic idea that in the light of 
facts proved to be extremely illusory, especially in many of those 
countries that were then defined “developing countries”. In spite of this, 
the attention paied by Schaff to considering how the structural changes 
have a direct influence on linguistic changes, not only concerns the 
complex phase of post-colonial industrialisation, but can also be well 
suited to the current globalisation phase. Indeed, it is a question of 
considering the processes of sociolinguistic transformations concerning 
not only aspects such as enriching one’s lexicon and syntactic variations, 
but also and fundamentally, “the pragmatics of language, that is to say 
its relation with social activity” (Schaff 1978: 136). This is a relation in 
which questions regarding the close mixture between communication 
and social reproduction and the connection between languages and new 
technologies today act in an essential way. 
The sociolinguistics that considers all these aspects mentioned in 
Schaff’s essay, has a philosophical-critical basis. According to this pro-
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ject, sociolinguistics examines dynamically and problematically what 
is linguistic as social and what is social as linguistic. Now it is im-
portant to add a second level: the semiotic, more precisely the socio-
semiotic one. By this, we mean a research field in the centre of what 
there is a sign, and more extensively, the verbal and non-verbal sign 
systems, which constitute “the social”, articulated into concrete 
processes of meaning generation.  
 
 
2. Social reproduction and the theoretical  
basis of sociosemiotics 
 
We have already mentioned the fact that expressions such as “lan-
guage and society” are to be avoided, because they seem to imply the 
separate existence of the two terms, although it is sometimes clear that 
expressions of this kind are used in an almost “conventional” sense, 
fully aware that there is no language outside society and vice versa. As 
Rossi-Landi says, language co-extends with society, which is of course 
made up of many other institutions, but sees language “interwoven in 
the mesh of everything” (Rossi-Landi 1985: 237). In this perspective, 
however, Rossi-Landi extends both the concept of “language” and that 
of “society”, opening up the former in the direction of the “sign 
systems” and transcribing the second in that of “social reproduction” 
(Rossi-Landi 1985: 237–238). The co-extensive presence of language in 
society may thus express a presence of the sign systems in the comple-
xity of social reproduction. Rossi-Landi writes: “[…] all operations of 
social practice, in their same essence, are sign operations“ (Rossi-
Landi 1972: 306). 
And then: 
 
We need to talk about sign systems, not only of language. The question 
of the position of language in social reproduction is that of the position 
of language among the other sign systems and it must be continuously 
translated into this (Rossi-Landi 1985: 239)3. 
                                                 
3   The English version of Rossi-Landi’s quotes is of the translator’s. 
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It is well known that social reproduction is always at the basis of Rossi-
Landi’s theoretic formulation (Rossi-Landi 1985: 27–84), “it is all the 
processes by means of which a community or a society survives, 
getting bigger or at least continuing to exist” (Rossi-Landi 1985: 238). 
The three phases in which it is articulated are: production, exchange 
and consumption. Sign systems act as movers of social reproduction 
and at the same time they are produced, exchanged and consumed in 
them. The concept of “sign system” contains the element of the 
completed transformation of a “body” in a “sign”, that is of something 
residual to semiosis, (Rossi-Landi 1985: 137–166). 
The sign, and more precisely sign systems, are thus the basic con-
cepts on which sociolinguistics intended as sociosemiotics is founded. 
At the basis of Rossi-Landi’s sociosemiotic reflection there is the topic 
of the production of sense in the social aspect: this reflection is 
characterised, as has already been mentioned referring to Schaff, as 
critical. In order to define “critical”, we must refer to its dual philo-
sophical valence. On the one hand Kantian, that is to say “critical” as 
an examination of the conditions which render sense possible. And on 
the other hand Marxian, that is to say “critical” as carefully revealing 
the ideological character of each manifestation of sense in society. The 
critical semiotic approach starts from the awareness that commu-
nicative planning and social organisation seem to have standardised 
human needs. By “standardisation” we mean flattening and distorting 
the human aspect for the unknowing repetition of communicative 
programs and alienated behaviour. A large part of Rossi-Landi’s 
research concerns the same ambivalence of what he called “common 
speech”, that is, the common condition of the possibility of natural 
languages, since the common sense (with stereotypes as its peak), is an 
integral part of and is reproduced by the natural language, and also 
because all the ideological connotations which survive in the language 
as the result of an oppressive and alienating social planning. 
Apart from the tradition which refers to Rossi-Landi’s reflections, 
socio-semiotics principally expresses itself along two other traditions: 
discursive socio-semiotics and social semiotics (Bernard 1995; Cale-
fato 1997: 18–22). The fundamental lines of the former have been 
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developed by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1991). According to Greimas, 
the notion of “discourse”, intended both as a linguistic entity and 
socio-cultural constraint (Marrone 2001: XXV), interprets the fact that 
a society only exists according to the sense given to it by the 
individuals and groups that make it up. As Greimas sees it, sense is 
underpinned by two fundamental organising principles: narrativity 
and figurality. The “semiotic object” is generated on the basis of 
“narrative universals”, that is categories and stable operating modes, 
which basically use the characters of Propp’s isolated narration in the 
magic fairy tales, on the one hand, and the taxonomic relations 
derived from Aristotle — contrariety, sub-contrariety, contradictori-
ness, complementarity, expressed in the “semiotic square” on the 
other. 
On the contrary, the concept of “language as social semiotics” 
elaborated by Halliday (1983) represents the intersection point 
between sociolinguistics of the Anglo-Saxon area (especially Basil 
Bernstein) and sociosemiotics in general. Language is mainly assumed 
to be verbal language and therefore considered in its fundamental role 
in the socialising process, of transmitting culture and social system 
tout court. According to Halliday, language, organized according to a 
grammatical structure, contains an innate semantic potential. A 
relation of dependence is thus set up between the grammatical system 
and the semantic system, in the sense that the former structures the 
latter. It is the language that produces social meanings, contexts, 
situations. Fundamental notions resulting from this definition are 
‘linguistic variety’, ‘register’ and ‘dialect’, considered not from the 
empirical point of view, that is to say as simple “recordings” of lan-
guage events, but as situation contexts which are organized and 
signified by the language as a whole. 
Halliday’s legacy in sociosemiotics is currently being developed, 
especially in the field of communication theory, by Gunther Kress who 
along with Robert Hodge has authored the volume Social Semiotics 
(Hodge, Kress 1988), in which social semiotics is integrated with 
critical awareness influenced especially by Marxism and by Foucault. 
Kress and Hodge propose the principle of “logonomic systems” 
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intended as “A set of rules prescribing the conditions for production 
and reception of meanings” (Hodge, Kress 1988: 4). Those in a society 
who are called upon to produce and those who receive the social 
meanings prescribe logonomic systems, so that it is possible to 
distinguish between “production regimes” and “reception regimes” 
(Hodge, Kress 1988: 4). It is an interesting and original development 
of Foucault’s conception of the order of discourse, suited to the mass-
media communicative systems of our age. 
At this point we can propose a comparison between the conceptual 
fields which derive from the notions of sign system, discourse, 
semantic potential and logonomic systems. All these fields actually 
concern an extension of the “linguistic” dimension from language to 
signification and significance. We use these two last concepts in the 
sense introduced by Charles Morris (1964), that is to say associating 
values to signs, the axiological directionality of social meanings. How 
do the sign systems structure these values? How do social discourses 
direct behaviour, prejudice, and implicit meanings of language? 
Which semantic potential acts as a “trigger” within a social repro-
duction which is today basically communication regulated by alie-
nating logonomic systems? 
Today it is possible to propose sociosemiotics which does not take 
the complexity of the approaches laid out here into consideration in a 
scholastic and schematic way, but in an open and free manner. All 
these approaches have valid intuitions for theory and praxis, especially 
in the context of the increasingly explicit development of the sign 
dimension of the social, in the form of general and planetary social 
communication which characterises our age. 
 
 
3. Language and social discourse 
 
In this respect it is obligatory to refer to another author whose work 
we may today consider in many senses a fundamental reference point 
for a semiotic foundation of sociolinguistic analysis: Roland Barthes, 
especially his critic of contemporary ideology and myths. In fact, 
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Barthes also has the merit of having introduced the critical approach 
to semiology (we use this term in a French speaking context referring 
up to at least the beginning of the 70’s), having “dissected” the ambi-
valent ideological power of sign systems in which common sense, 
stereotypes and mythology of our present are organized. Barthes held, 
most certainly in a manner of provocation and defiance, that there is 
no sense what is not uttered or “spoken” by language, and that 
opposite to what Saussure had stated, linguistics includes semiotics 
(Barthes 1974a: 3–5; Barthes 1974b). Rossi-Landi has, however, always 
objected to Barthes, saying that verbal language is not the only big 
sense “container”, because it, in the meaning of “language” plus 
“common speech”, is “spoken” by the alienating linguistic structures 
(Rossi-Landi 1972: 11–12). The pre-eminence of linguistics, therefore, 
may be defiance, as it often happens with Barthes, but it can also be 
shaped by the situation of alienation which remains in the sphere of 
language. 
In one of his essays of 1970, La linguistique du discours, Roland 
Barthes introduces the concept of “linguistics of the discourse” or 
“translinguistics” (Barthes 1970a: 191). Unlike linguistics in the strict 
sense, whose object is the text, the object of translinguistics is 
discourse (Barthes 1970a: 192). Both, says Barthes, work with a single 
substance, that of spoken language; but while text has a purely 
communicative aim, discourse varies according to further aims. 
Barthes suggests the following definition of “discourse”: 
 
Any finite extension of word, unitary from the content point of view, 
expressed and structured for secondary purposes of communication, 
culturalised by different factors to those of language (Barthes 1970a: 
192)4. 
 
As Benveniste (1971) wanted, linguistics would use the sentence as its 
upper limit, as a “link between text and discourse” (Barthes 1970a: 
193); whereas the territory of translinguistics may be situated “beyond 
                                                 
4   Barthes’ quotes come from the Italian translation of his article. The English 
version is of the translators’. 
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the sentence”. If, writes Barthes, still following Benveniste’s formu-
lation and more generally the typical procedure of structural analysis, 
sense is acquired when a unit of one level is included among the units 
of an immediately higher level (Barthes 1970a: 193) and if the sentence 
is “the last level of linguistic integration and the first level of 
translinguistic integration” (Barthes 1970a: 194), it is on social praxis 
that discourse is to be articulated and to acquire its sense and its 
“reference” (Barthes 1970a: 194–195). In this perspective, the task of 
translinguistics is that of “codifying the reference”, always making the 
notions of “context” and “situation” (Barthes 1970a: 196) stand out. 
Barthes made these considerations in the phase of full maturity of 
his “system” (see Marrone 1994). His “provocative” preference for 
linguistics including semiology that contained in his previous Ele-
ments of Semiology and that overthrew Saussure’s concept (Barthes 
1974a), appears in this context to be a methodological choice for a 
science where each system and process of the object is modelled on 
spoken language in which “the subsequent signs predominate signi-
ficantly over the simultaneous ones” (Barthes 1970a: 191). The suc-
cession, the linearity, the fundamental “irreversibility of the message” 
(Barthes 1970a: 191) which characterises the translinguistic systems 
thus opens, beyond the sentence, onto an immense territory, consisting 
of the whole universe of “situations”, that is of the social praxis where 
according to Barthes, the language is exposed to “secondary com-
munication objectives” and to “different factors” (Barthes 1970a: 191) 
of culturalisation. 
In this framework, we may, therefore, consider language to be the 
product of human verbal linguistic activity, articulated in a system and 
in a process which gives life to infinite varieties of natural languages 
and is subject to the variation in history and use. Discourse, however, 
may be seen as putting language into practice, a communicative praxis 
in which the fundamental fact is that a linguistic system is rooted in its 
speakers and in “where” the speaker is located, in what roles and 
hierarchies the language produces. In the light of the definition 
mentioned above, it is important that those “different factors” which 
Barthes talks about be inserted in the verbal dimension. It is possible 
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to extend Barthes’ notion of “linguistics of the discourse” to that of 
“linguistics of social discourse”, where the latter refers to all the social 
practices of language, and where it opens to the multiplicity of 
“langues” and “langages” from which social communication is created. 
In this sense, language can not be considered without its speakers, that 
is to say, without its actors and its subjects “embodied” in the world. 
This need, which appears every time articulated language comes to the 
fore, is the same necessity that gave birth to sociolinguistics as a 
discipline characterised, unlike general linguistics, by the special 
attention paid to the relation between language and its speakers 
(Berruto 1995: 67). 
All the most recent and careful research in the field of socio-
linguistics and sociosemiotics, intended in the broadest sense, con-
siders both how language changes speakers and is, in turn, modified 
by them, and how the same notion of “speaker” considered in the 
current context of communication and in relation to the role of the 
media in the present time, extends and not only metaphorically, to 
fields which go beyond the verbal level and which make even the 
simple definition of “environment made of words” (Simone 2000: 29–
49) controversial. At this point it is interesting to reflect on the arti-
culated and linear nature of the objects of such linguistics, since 
certain systems different from language but nevertheless based on it, 
are characterised by “simultaneity” — for instance, “simultaneity” is 
typical of the communication and language of digital and IT media 
and of the knowledge model they convey. 
 
 
4. The system, the process, the social 
 
In the introduction to the updated Italian edition of the essay Lan-
guage and Society (now called Language and Social Context), originally 
published in English in 1972 (Giglioli 1972) and in Italian in 1973 
(Giglioli 1973), Giolo Fele and Pier Paolo Giglioli introduce the texts 
contained in the book — fundamental texts for sociolinguistics — 
stating that, in general terms, this discipline “studies language as a 
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social phenomenon” (Giglioli, Fele 2000: 7). Sociolinguistics differs 
from linguistics, in the narrow sense of the term because its interests 
include: 
 
any attempt to study language not from inside the system or the code (as 
the linguistic tradition in the strict sense of the term does), but in any 
possible deviation in relation to the use that any community of speakers 
may make of it (Giglioli, Fele 2000: 7)5. 
 
Schematizing further, Fele and Giglioli claim that linguistics is 
interested in everything that concerns the “internal logic of the 
system”, everything that “remains still and fixed” and that “does not 
depend on the context” on linguistics, whereas variability, mutability 
and the concrete use of any linguistic system by the speakers concerns 
sociolinguistics (Giglioli, Fele: 2000: 7–8). Indeed, the “linguist” 
examples (meaning “the linguists brought as examples”) referred to by 
the authors, especially Bloomfield and Chomsky, belong to a lin-
guistics that is not interested in variation, mutation, and context and 
that, on the contrary — as in the case of Chomsky’s generative-trans-
formational linguistics — expressly rejects these kinds of issue. In spite 
of this, Fele’s and Giglioli’s observations can not be considered perti-
nent to the structural linguistic tradition with semiotic background, in 
particular Ferdinand de Saussure on the one hand, and the Prague 
circle, with its evolution through Roman Jakobson, on the other. 
Incorporating the study of language in a system according to a 
model or the structural activity, as Barthes called it (Barthes 1972: 308), 
means disassembling and re-assembling an “object” so that the 
operating rules of the “object” itself can be manifested in the dis-
assembly/re-assembly. The structure then makes something apparent 
that, as Barthes says, stayed invisible in the “natural” object. Therefore, 
talking about a linguistic “system” allows us to perceive language not 
as nomenclature, but as a group of fundamental elements, dependent 
on one another, associated according to particular links and modelling. 
                                                 
5   The English version is of the translators’. 
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From the structuralist point of view, these links are defined as binary 
opposition links. Values are relational and combine differences. 
There is an anti-structuralist prejudice in the current interpretation 
that denies socio-linguistic interest to these twentieth-century ap-
proaches, engaged in mainly considering the structural hold of the 
notion of sign (verbal or generally linguistic) inside the “system”. This 
antistructuralist prejudice has partly been implicitly criticized here 
when we included Barthes’s works — heir, even if “heretic” to the 
structuralist trend — among the main contributions to the foundation 
of sociolinguistics on semiotic bases. However, a further in-depth 
study can explain not only the limits of this prejudice, but also the 
complexity of the notion “social” from a semiotic point of view. 
We can start with the well-known statement from the Cours de 
linguistique générale, written by the two pupils Bally and Séchehaye 
on the lectures Saussure gave between 1906 and 1911: Speech has both 
an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without 
the other (Saussure 1959: 8). 
The individual side is exactly that of parole, of the single word; the 
social side is that of the langue, of the linguistic material which works 
“by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of the 
community” (Saussure 1959: 14). The “contract” element conceals the 
imprint of a philosophy “of exchange” at the base of Saussure’s 
linguistics, for which “social” is synonymous with “collective” (Ponzio 
1973: 153–161) and langue joins individuals bound to one another by 
a contract. However, this “social aspect” is at the basis of the notion of 
sign’s arbitrariness, which is fundamental for Saussure’s semiology. 
Arbitrariness, that is the fact that the signifier is unmotivated in 
relation to the signified, on the one hand “holds together” the 
linguistic system, like a game of chess as “artificial realization of what 
language offers in a natural form” (Saussure 1959: 88), and on the 
other hand it is socially established. The theme of the arbitrary nature 
of the sign is one of the Saussurean questions which has raised most 
controversy and discussion (De Mauro 1978: 414–416). Regarding the 
relation between the arbitrary nature of the sign and the system, 
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Saussure’s Cours offers an example taken from a non verbal semiotic 
field, that is, the polite formulas: 
 
Polite formulas, for instance, though often imbued with a certain natural 
expressiveness (as in the case of a Chinese who greets his emperor by 
bowing down to the ground nine times), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it 
is this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to 
use them. (Saussure 1959: 68) 
 
It is interesting to note how — without prejudice against the pre-
eminence of the verbal that the Cours tends to confirm compared to 
other semiological systems — the example of the polite formulas 
allows us to understand the conventional, not natural nor symbolic 
nature of the sign in general. It may not be by accident that this 
happens when we use a non-verbal system as an example. In spite of 
this, almost wanting to confirm the opinion of Barthes in his Elements 
of Semiology, the previous quote proceeds as follows:  
 
Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of 
the semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and 
universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in 
this sense linguistics can become the  aster-pattern for all branches of 
semiology although language is only one particular semiological system. 
Saussure 1959: 68) 
 
It has been pointed out that, by virtue of a greater attention to 
Saussure’s lessons, the concept of “arbitrary” is better defined as 
“unmotivated”. Benveniste on the other hand, unlike Saussure’s Cours, 
clarifies how the relation between signified and signifier is more 
necessary than arbitrary (De Mauro 1978: 415). Actually, in the 
structuralist logic, both “unjustified” or “arbitrary” on the one hand, 
and “necessary” on the other, work equally if it is a question of de-
monstrating the non-naturality of the linguistic sign system, first of all 
of the verbal one. But this non-naturality does not mean “non-social”, 
on the contrary, in spite of all the arguments about the concept of 
“social” as “collective” in the context of the Cours, as we noted above. 
De Mauro underlines the fundamental importance of the relation 
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existing between the theme of the arbitrariness of the sign and the 
method of the synchronic analysis in order to recognise the central 
role of the element of sociality in Saussure. Synchrony and diachrony 
are for the Cours the two guiding principles of linguistic analysis: the 
former refers to a “state of language”, the second to a “phase of 
evolution” (Saussure 1959: 81). If the sign is arbitrary through the 
coexistence of signified and signifier inside ona and the same system, 
it follows, as De Mauro writes: “that all the value of a sign depends, 
through the system, on the society which keeps the complex of the 
system alive in a certain way (De Mauro 1978: 424)6. 
In the Cours, sociolinguistics has found a paradox (called “Labov’s 
paradox” after the name of the “father” of sociolinguistics who intro-
duced the terms): if on the one hand it is the langue which constitutes 
the social element of the language, whereas parole constitutes the 
individual one, the importance that the former assumes in Saussure’s 
method contrasts with the perspective of the synchronic analysis, 
about which the Cours states: 
 
Synchrony has only one perspective, the speakers’, and its whole method 
consists of gathering evidence from speakers; to know to just what 
extent a thing is a reality, it is necessary and sufficient to determine to 
what extent it exists in the minds of speakers. (Saussure 1959: 90) 
 
The paradox is: if the speaking subjects have to bear witness to the 
synchronic reality of the language, parole would be the central element 
in the analysis of variation, a key concept for sociolinguistics. Let us 
quote some more parts of the Cours: “It is in speaking [parole] that the 
germ of all change is found. Each change is launched by a certain 
number of individuals before it is accepted for general use.” (Saussure 
1959: 98). This is a contradiction which Voloshinov replied to well 
before Labov by criticising the langue/parole dichotomy and pro-
posing a theory of utterance in which the social is seen in a mate-
rialistic perspective. Despite the paradoxicality, it is however possible 
                                                 
6    The English version is of the translator’s. 
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to recognize the complex value of Saussure’s method, that is to say the 
possibility of looking at things in a dual, “two-pronged” manner.  
 
 
5. From parole to utterance 
 
In Saussure’s Cours “society” is defined as a social mass, a speaking 
mass (Saussure 1959: 71, 77–78), compared to which the signifier, 
which also seems to have been freely chosen in relation to the idea it 
represents, appears to not be free but imposed: “The masses have no 
voice in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language could be re-
placed by no other.” (Saussure 1959: 71).  
Since the linguistic sign is arbitrary, it “escapes from our will”, its 
law is a thing which is “tolerated” (Saussure 1959: 71). It is precisely 
the arbitrariness of the sign which “protects language from any at-
tempt to modify it” (Saussure 1959: 73). In this sense, the strong 
expression that Barthes uses when he defines language “fascist” can be 
considered legitimate (Barthes 1981: 7–9). It is also interesting to note 
the reference made in the Cours to non-verbal sign systems like 
fashion, which is not entirely arbitrary, because “we can deviate only 
slightly from the conditions dictated by the humanbody” (Saussure 
1978: 7576). In The Fashion System, however, Barthes contrasts this 
statement, by declaring — with a message directed at Benveniste — 
that it is not the linguistic sign which is arbitrary but in language “a 
general law rigidly limits the power of the users on the system” 
(Barthes 1970b: 217). With this, however, Barthes only confirms what 
is written in Saussure’s Course, where “arbitrariness” certainly does 
not mean freedom of the users on the system, in fact, far from this. 
However, in language, what De Mauro calls a “dialectic between 
continuity and transformation” (De Mauro 1978: 421), between 
immutability and mutability and between arbitrariness and historicity is 
established. If language is “all the linguistic habits which allow a subject 
to understand and make itself understood” (Saussure 1959: 75), in order 
for it to be language a “speaking mass”, a social force which combines its 
action with that of the time is required (Saussure 1959: 76).  
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As has been mentioned, Voloshinov radically criticised the concept 
of “social” in his formulation where he defined “abstract objectivism”, 
in which the Saussurean theory is explicitly included as it had been 
passed down from the Course. Voloshinov firstly criticises the “sys-
tem” of linguistics, the offspring, he says, of philology: 
 
At the basis of those linguistic methods of thought which lead to the 
creation of language as a system of legally identical forms, there is the 
practical and theoretical orientation towards a study of others’ dead lan-
guages, preserved in the monuments of writing (Voloshinov 1999: 190)7. 
 
According to Voloshinov, linguistics inspired by objectivism has 
inherited an indelible trademark of its philological origin. Although 
the epistemological division between linguistics and philology is expli-
citly declared in the Saussurean Course, Voloshinov does not believe 
that the passage has been completed. He asks what a philologist is: 
 
 […] the philologist is always and wherever a describer of “secret” 
writing and words and a master, an informer of what is deciphered and 
transmitted by tradition. […] The first philologists and the first linguists 
were always priests (Voloshinov 1999: 193). 
 
The land on which the ancient philosophy of language was 
constructed, says Voloshinov, consisted of the Vedic doctrine of the 
word, the Logos of ancient Greece and the biblical philosophy of the 
word. Like the ancient Vedic priest, the contemporary linguist is 
dominated by the magical, sacred role of the word of others with 
which they cannot manage to make their own word interact properly, 
which is experienced without feeling the thickness, as if it were a 
“usual dress” (Voloshinov 1999: 194). 
Indeed, as has been recently discovered through the publication of 
Saussure’s so-called Manuscripts of Harvard, the Indian culture held 
great interest for the Genevan linguist. “I, personally, do not believe in 
the possibility of freeing India in a summary manner” (Saussure 1994: 
                                                 
7   Voloshinov’s quotes come from the Italian translation of his article. The 
English version is of the translator’s. 
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99), he wrote, ridiculing the western pretence of reducing something 
like 3000 years of language and culture into superficial formulae. What 
Saussure was particularly fascinated about was the linguistic structure 
of the Vedic hymns, which according to him had been transmitted 
unchanged for 30 centuries by means of oral transmission from master 
to disciple., in an area which includes a population of 200 million 
inhabitants (now almost 900). Saussure states how Vedic poetry is 
literally full of anagrams, linguistic games and cryptograms with 
names. This characteristic allows for the “almost superhuman” abso-
lute absence of different versions in the Veda, which Saussure defined 
as a sort of universal principal, without an author (whether divine or 
human) and inspired by the idea of the pre-existence of the word, of 
the sound, of the vocal figure which designs the objects, compared to 
the objects themselves. 
According to Voloshinov, linguistics as an offspring of philology 
has assumed monological utterance as its basis of analyses, ignoring 
the social dimension, which he calls a social utterance (Voloshinov 
1999: 202–203). According to Voloshinov and the Bahtin school 
where he belonged, the concept of “utterance” exceeds the notion of 
individual parole as opposed to langue. The dispute that Voloshinov 
held against Saussure, probably influenced by the theories of Marr, 
assumes an understandable vehemence in the context of the theo-
retical debate in the first few years of the 20th century in Europe, both 
in the linguistic field as well as more generally within that of human 
sciences. However, the contribution of the so-called “school of Bahtin” 
to overcoming the “abstract hypostatising objectivism” (Voloshinov 
1999: 185) of a linguistic system designed as a group of invariable and 
indisputable standards lays the the foundation for a materialistic and 
dynamic vision of language intended as a social practice, whose main 
lines are indicated below. 
Language is carried out in discourse and discourse is articulated in 
utterances, that is in operations of “starting to speak”, of ideological 
“positioning” in it, by social subjects. The utterances in turn are realised 
by means of enunciated words, by means of complete verbal realisations 
which we may consider minimal communication units. Utterance 
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establishes the social dimension of language, considering the fact that it 
assumes at least one speaker and one listener in order to be realised. 
This means that a social relation consists of at least “two sides”. The 
standard structures of utterance, whether they concern orality or writing 
as “relatively stable types” of utterance, constitute discourse types. 
Conversation, dialogue, monologue, reading, direct reply, indirect 
speech etc. are “simple” discourse types, or as Bahtin defines them, 
“primary” ones. Then, there are more complicated (or “secondary”) 
discourse types, like literary genres (novels — detective, erotic, 
epistolary, etc.; poetry; epics; tragedy, and so on). The types of discourse 
are varied and can consist of as little as one word or be as long as a novel 
of several volumes. The primary types are a part of the daily reality and 
of immediate verbal communication, while the secondary types are a 
part of a more complex cultural communication, above all written. 
Talking about utterances of daily life and types of discourse 
connected to this, let us consider Voloshinov’s claim that the “form” 
of the dialogue represents the most natural form of language 
(Voloshinov 1999: 244–245). We talk about “form” of dialogue here 
and not of “type”, in order to distinguish between a characteristic 
connected to the social dimension of language and a type of discourse 
which we commonly and explicitly manage to recognise as a dialogue. 
The dialogicity of which Voloshinov and Bahtin talk, is also present in 
what we usually define as “interior monologue”, as well as in the diary 
or autobiographical “speaking to oneself”, in which the discourse is 
always broken down into separate remarks, into questions and 
answers through which the multiplicity of “I’s” who make up the so-
called individual subjectivity is developed.  
Voloshinov is highly critical of the sanctifying attitude in front of 
the authority of the word by others which he details in his own 
linguistics of abstract objectivism, and to oppose it, he proposes a 
pragmatic approach to the relationship between “one’s own” words 
and words of the “others”, or between one’s own discourse and that of 
the others, to put it better. He uses two expressions derived from 
Wölfflin to define two styles of others’ discourse transmission: linear 
style and pictorial style. Concerning the former, he writes: “its basic 
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tendency is to create clear external frameworks of others’ discourse 
with a very weak internal determination” (Voloshinov 1999: 249). In 
the latter case, however, “language elaborates the ways for a more 
subtle and malleable inclusion of author’s reply and comment in 
others’ discourse” (Voloshinov 1999: 249).   
A typical aspect of this latter direction is the development of 
“mixed variations” of others’ discourse transmission. Apart from the 
more malleable variants of direct discourse, there are two other 
variants that are important and are analysed by Voloshinov through a 
comparison between different languages: indirect improper discourse 
and, above all, free indirect discourse which, “further weakens the 
confines of the others’ utterance” (Voloshinov 1999: 251), and the 
significance of which has been noted by Ponzio (Ponzio 1999b: 39), 
Social orientation of the utterance, its plurivocity — whether it be 
explicit, potential or understood — comes from the constitutional 
dialogicity of the word, from the fact that in any case the verbal sign 
does not only need to be identified, recognised, decoded, but above all 
it has to be understood in its response, as if the interpretation assumes 
the form of the reply to the phrase of a dialogue. The interpreter of 
responding comprehension (Ponzio, Calefato, Petrilli 1994) is what 
the utterance of daily life always calls for. Even when the mere level of 
the sign system and of identification would be sufficient to recognise 
the meaning of an utterance, social comprehension always concerns 
content and aspects of the discourse which transcend the sign system 
and identification, often concerning the implied part (verbal or extra-
verbal) of the utterance. 
Therefore, the utterance does not “reflect” the extraverbal situation 
as if it was simply transmitting a meaning produced before through 
language: in the annunciation the situation is interpreted and 
evaluated, it is in the annunciation that the meaning made up of both 
verbal and extraverbal material, and expressed both in signs and in 
values, is reproduced, circulates and enriches. Utterances produce 
contexts, in other words they produce effects of sense, feelings, values, 
behaviour, social roles, hierarchies, differences. Language is basically 
always action, praxis, relation.  
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6. Languages, language, communication 
 
In a reconstruction of the history of the linguistic trends between the 
end of the 19th century and the first few decades of the 20th century, 
Roman Jakobson recalls the controversy on the Saussurean Course 
risen in his Theses of 1929 by the Prague linguistic circle of which he 
was a leading figure. Jakobson acknowledges as fundamental Saus-
sure’s intuitive understanding (derived from the stoic concept) that 
the sign has two facets, the perceptible signans and the intelligible 
signatum (Jakobson 1971: 717). The two Latin terms are used by 
Jakobson instead of the Saussurean signifiant and signifié: the same 
choice is also followed by Rossi-Landi, who underlines how these two 
terms of Augustinian origin are more correct both in order to 
overcome the “mentalistic ambiguity of the Saussurean signifié” 
(Rossi-Landi 1985: 151), and in respect to a dynamic and non-static 
function of semiosis. Every signatum may indeed become in turn the 
signans of something else, in a multilevelled and open semiosic process.  
As regards the Saussurean notions of synchrony and diachrony, 
Jakobson blames the Course for remaining anchored to a “neo-
grammatical” concept of diachrony, although it had anticipated the 
new structural approach to the synchrony of language (Jakobson 1971: 
721). The controversy of the “Prague circle” towards Saussure actually 
consisted in the greater attention that they paid to the fact that the 
diachronic transformations of language, starting with the phonological 
ones, exist in the functioning of the system. These considerations are 
emerge  against the background of what Jakobson calls a “nomotetic” 
viewpoint of seeking laws within the framework of human sciences 
(Jakobson 1971: 656). As a result of this, no linguistic change can be 
understood or interpreted without referring to the system that 
undergoes it and to the function that the change has within the same 
system. At the same time, no language can be described fully and 
adequately without taking into account the changes that are in pro-
gress. In this perspective Jakobson writes: 
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The diachronic linguistics of today examines the succession of dynamic 
synchronies, confronts them, and, in this way, delineates the evolution 
of a language in a wider historical perspective, with due attention not 
only to the mutability of the linguistic system but also to its immutable, 
static elements (Jakobson 1971: 721). 
 
De Mauro, in the notes to the Italian translation of the Cours, 
underlines the fact that the Prague Circle controversy can be removed 
by considering how in Saussure the opposition between synchrony 
and diachrony is not in the “things” that the researcher is occupied 
with (in matière), but in the point of view, the objet of the linguistic 
analysis (De Mauro 1978: 427). Without prejudice towards these 
considerations, which have had a significant role in the history of 20th 
century linguistics, the point of view of critical socio-linguistic analysis 
founded on a semiotic basis should be put foward in this context. In 
particular, pointing out the relationship between synchrony and 
diachrony helps to acknowledge the modelling role played by the sign 
systems in the complex articulation between the instances of change, 
experimentation and mutability that they convey, and the internal 
resistances, “necessary” but often operating in an alienating manner, 
innate in social reproduction of which the sign systems themselves 
belong to.  
It is, therefore, of particular importance today to read again some 
observations made by Jakobson both on the relationship between 
linguistics and sociolinguistics and between language and other 
communication systems. Jakobson includes linguistics within the 
framework of semiotics, intended as a general science of signs, in the 
same way as it was foreseen, nominated and delineated in Locke’s 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “semeiotiké or the ‘doctrine 
of signs’, the most usual whereof being words” (Jakobson 1971: 657). 
The Lockian term of “semiotics” was maintained by Peirce, whereas 
Saussure proposed “semiology” to indicate the general science of signs 
considered in their relationship with language. According to Jakobson, 
both Locke and Saussure were right to consider language “the central 
and most important among all semiotic systems” (Jakobson 1971: 658). 
However, a comparison between language and other types of sign is of 
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vital importance for linguistics itself because it shows what properties 
are shared by the various sign systems and which ones are, on the 
other hand, specific to the verbal (Jakobson 1971: 658).  
The sociolinguistic approach comes within this framework. 
Jakobson reminds how all the various questions advanced under the 
label of “sociolinguistics” require the same structural analysis common 
to all other linguistic perspectives (Jakobson 1971: 667). Following this 
framework, Jakobson lays the basis for what we could define a 
sociolinguistics that is at the same time functionalist, since it considers 
above all the functional varieties of language, and interpretative 
because it assumes that there is co-determination between linguistic 
behaviour and social facts (Berruto 1995: 29). Jakobson says that a 
linguistic community has at its disposal: 
 
more explicit and more elliptic patterns, with an orderly scale of 
transitions from a maximal explicitness to an extreme ellipsis, 2) a 
purposive alternation of more archaic and newfangled distinctions, 3) a 
patent difference between rules of ceremonial, formal and informal, 
slovenly speech (Jakobson 1971: 667). 
 
On these bases, social rules are established in a community which 
allow, prescribe or prohibit the word or silence, in accordance with 
what could be defined as ceremonial rules under linguistic practice. 
Moreover, continues Jakobson, our linguistic performance is governed 
by a competence of monological or dialogical rules which are 
determined by social behaviour. For instance, verbal relations between 
the transmitter and the receiver build the grammatical categories of 
gender and person. In the same way, the role covered in language by 
the rules connected to the social role, to the sex, or age of the 
interlocutors, forms a linguistic “challenge” to the idea of a static and 
uniform language. The structuralist sociolinguistic approach says 
Jakobson, dispels the myth of uniform linguistic communities, 
highlights the role of centrifugal and centripetal forces on a territorial 
and social plane, opens in the speakers the awareness of variations, of 
distinctions and of changes in the verbal system, also opening the 
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metalinguistic consciousness which forms “a crucial intralinguistic 
factor” (Jakobson 1971: 668).  
There follows an essential passage: 
  
Since verbal messages analyzed by linguists are linked with commu-
nication of nonverbal messages or with exchange of utilities and mates, 
the linguist research is to be supplemented by wider semiotic and 
anthropological investigation (Jakobson 1971: 669). 
 
Linguistic analysis and social analysis therefore proceed in an 
integrated manner: the Jakobsonian references are above all to Tru-
betskoj, founder of structural phonology and an important member of 
the Prague circle, and to Benveniste, theorist of utterance; but also to 
Lévi-Strauss and to Rossi-Landi. Indeed, the “natural” job of the 
linguist, according to Jakobson, is that of bringing out the primordial 
significance of the concept of “communication” (Jakobson 1971: 663) 
for the social sciences. Jakobson reminds us how Trubetskoj had 
conceived the idea of the integrated sciences of communication back 
in 1926, Benveniste assumed the problem of discovering the common 
basis to language and to society and of comparing their fundamental 
units, Lévi-Strauss proposed an integrated science of communication 
including social anthropology, economy and linguistics (Jakobson 
1971: 663), and Rossi-Landi, in the same period in which Jakobson 
wrote these texts on communication (1960’s), considered goods as 
particular types of messages (Jakobson 1971: 665). 
Basically, what comes from these Jakobsonian writings of the 
1960’s is the idea of a semiotic basis for the study of language as social 
communication. A particularly crucial insight in the perspective of the 
technological revolution, whose embryonic features began to develop 
in those years, is contained in the speech which Jakobson made in 
Milan in 1968 at the conference Languages in Society and in Technique, 
sponsored by Olivetti. Here he proposed a classification of signs 
according to the way in which they had been produced: either directly 
organic or instrumental (Jakobson 1971: 701). Amongst the visual 
signs for instance, gestures are directly produced by the bodily organs, 
while painting and sculpture imply the use of instruments. Amongst 
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the auditory signs, the word and vocal music belong to the first type, 
while instrumental music belongs to the second. Jakobson writes that 
even when the telephone or the radio reproduce the “organic voice”, it 
always remains such. However (and here lies an interesting insight by 
Jakobson), 
 
the wider diffusion in space and time does not remain without influence 
upon the relation between the speaker and his audience and herewith 
upon the makeup of messages. (Jakobson 1971: 701) 
 
The changes within the framework of what Jakobson called “new 
media” (now a common expression but very new at the time), produce 
significant effects, important for linguistic and sociological research, 
both in the context of production and perception of messages (Jakob-
son 1971: 702). Here Jakobson makes direct reference to the telephone 
and to the radio, as well as to cinema which has been transformed 
from a simple mechanism of reproduction of the image into an 
intricate and independent semiotic system (Jakobson 1971: 702). 
These considerations allow us to reflect in a manner which we now 
call “socio-semiotic” on the processes of transformation of the 
“organic” signs into signs of a new type, which cannot be simply 
defined as being “instrumental”, but which articulate the relationship 
between organic and instrumental in a new and complex manner, 
expanding the confines of the organic and at the same time “natu-
ralising” the instrumental element. 
In the same text, Jakobson defines the difference between 
communication and information: in his opinion, whereas the former 
implies a recognisable transmitter, the source from which the latter is 
issued is not recognised as the transmitter by the message interpreter 
(Jakobson 1971: 703). In any case, this difference, whether it be shared 
or not, has many theoretical implications on what are today 
commonly described as sciences of communication, which often have 
to do with a semiotic model in which it is certainly impossible to 
recognise a transmitter as a primary source of messages — see, for 
example, the case of telecommunication networks. According to 
Jakobson, the study of language in relation to other communication 
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systems also takes into account the necessity of distinguishing between 
homogeneous messages, which use a single system of signs, and 
syncretic messages based on a combination of different sign systems 
(Jakobson 1971: 705). These combinations are found in different social 
forms, as anthropology has demonstrated by studying for instance 
societies where poetry has developed not as a spoken but a sung verse 
(Jakobson 1971: 705). Jakobson adds that “modern culture develops 
the most complex syncretic spectacles, such as musicals and in 
particular cinematic musicals, making joint use of several auditory and 
visual semiotic media” (Jakobson 1971: 705). 
A characteristic of current cultures and societies is the widespread 
metalinguistic awareness (that consists of a crucial intralinguistic 
factor, to use Jakobson’s expression) of the generalised presence of 
syncretic sign systems in which not necessarily the verbal language, or 
not only the verbal language plays a dominant role. This does not 
mean that “only today” communication is articulated in complex 
systems, quite the contrary. However, the fact that communication has 
pervaded all social reproduction constitutes, almost retroactively, the 
reason why metalinguistic consciousness lives in a world, an Umwelt, 
as Sebeok would say, in which several sign systems interact. In the 
following pages these concepts will be specified. 
 
 
7. Society as the human Umwelt 
 
As has been said, Italian “linguaggio” means a modelling device of the 
world: this device is something unique to human beings amongst the 
earth’s living creatures, as both Sebeok and Ponzio have demonstrated 
(Sebeok 1990; Sebeok, Petrilli, Ponzio 2001). Of course, every living 
being, from the most biologically elementary, has a way of organising 
its “world”, its surrounding environment, its Umwelt. One of these 
modes may be for instance the “territory” for most mammals. How-
ever, language only structures the human Umwelt, that world whose 
“limits” are actually, as Wittgenstein said, the limits of language, 
because it is language which simulates it, represents it, organises it.  
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Language as a modelling device comes before speaking and 
communicating, that is those eminently verbal activities which are 
articulated in languages, in discourses, in utterances. Language is the 
result of what Sebeok has called human adaptation, originating about 
two million years ago with Homo sapiens. Speaking is externalising 
and it is the outcome of this modelling system based on syntax, in 
other words on a sequential and regulated organisation of signs. 
The infant, who, as we say, “learns to speak”, possesses language 
even before being able to reproduce words and sentences: their crying 
and their rhythmical gestures, first, their goo-goos and their babbling, 
are all forms by means of which young human beings organise their 
bodily matter in space, in time, in relation to their needs and above all 
in relation to the others who are around them — first of all the mother 
or the father. The deaf and dumb and subjects who do not have 
listening or speaking capacity due to some physical handicap, still have 
language in the sense of the modelling system, on the basis of which it 
is possible for them to practice all internationally recognised forms of 
communication and articulate even in different linguistic areas.  
However, it would not be correct to think that this modelling 
activity, which we have called “linguaggio” and which we have 
distinguished from speaking, is something “internal”, a “content” of 
being human, one of its biological “faculties”. Language is not a system 
included in human consciousness, because what we call “conscious-
ness” is language itself, and is a historically and socially determined 
context even in its “natural” functions and components. If it is true 
that speaking is a consequence of language, it is also true that human 
communicative systems increase the functions and the techniques of 
language itself and improve the non-verbal ability of human beings 
enormously. Making a distinction between language and speaking is 
useful on a theoretical level in order to avoid improper simplification 
which defines language as an instrument for communicating, at the 
same time considering the communication according to the unidi-
rectional and monological model of a passage of information from a 
transmitter to a receiver that understand one another as a result of a 
common semantic code. However, the distinction does not imply an 
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absolute separation: on the contrary, amongst the different terms — 
language and speaking, language and communication — there is a 
lively and always current interaction. Indeed, what is the specifically 
human Umwelt if it is not the social context, the human relation 
between individuals?  
While animals are their modelling devices, human beings objectify 
their modelling devices, i.e. the language and its “syntax”, and are 
capable of reproducing them and externalising them through speech 
and communication. Here, “objectification” means the anthropo-
logical category that indicates the historical and social forms in which 
human nature is expressed. Human linguistic activity, either as 
language-consciousness, or as “linear” organisation called speaking, is 
part of the social mechanism of objectification. In this sense, speaking 
intervenes retroactively on language, even managing to modify the 
forms and the structures, and thus showing the close relation that 
exists between our significant social practices and our consciousness.  
If for the living creatures of our planet there are different Um-
welten, that is different “worlds” surrounding each species, or better, 
that each species manages to perceive and structures in relation to its 
own nature, the human being is characterised by living above all in 
relation to others, in more or less rudimental forms of society. Human 
societies differ from all the assorted forms of animal aggregation 
because by using language humans are capable of objectifying the 
social context in the sense explained above, in other words they are 
capable of reproducing and planning, not only their natural conditions 
of life, but also and in a significant manner, their reciprocal relations. 
This does not mean, of course, that human beings are characterised by 
an “inborn” desire for survival and natural evolution, on the contrary: 
war, genocide, destruction of others’ lives and of nature are part of 
those social plans which human beings are unfortunately capable of 
realising, as history recalls, even in the most alienated, criminal and 
“crazy” forms.  
Language allows human relations to be objectified, since it is, in 
turn, implicated by these relations: indeed the conditions that have 
permitted homination are above all of a social order, that is they are 
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based on the human need to establish a relation with others. This 
relation, however, comes before what is usually called communication. 
“Relation with others” actually means first of all giving a form to a 
common feeling, a common meaning. It means learning, interacting 
with the other body, the expressions of signs which articulate this 
common signifying. It is, in effect, from a certain point of view, an 
activity which has to do with “communicating”, in the etymological 
sense of “sharing” more than “transmitting” or “informing”. Sharing a 
complex system of discontinuous features — the signs — which 
organise the matter and transforming it into society; that is in an 
articulated network of relations between human beings, and between 
human beings and “world”. 
Language, intended in this way, is society, in the sense that the first 
matter that language “transforms” and organises into signs is the 
relation with others, it is the social context. A fundamental part of this 
transformation is the relation of sex, on the basis of which gender is 
produced as a semiotic category, in which the man-woman difference 
is articulated socially and culturally.  
As Rossi-Landi writes, “society is the aspect assumed by matter on 
a human level” (Rossi-Landi 1985: 32). Linguistic matter is a system in 
which social values take shape: in this sense it should not be separated 
from the model through which we look at the production processes of 
these values, that is through which we look at the formation of matter 
itself. It is closely and constantly connected to the model and to the 
project which organises this complexity, to that dimension of the 
language which makes it a simulating apparatus of the matter itself, 
although this dimension can never be considered exhaustive and 
gratifying.  
“Language” as a modelling device is applied to materials made up 
of different types of signs. For instance we can talk about the language 
of dance, articulated in movements and positions of the body in space; 
about the language of music, articulated in rhythm; about language of 
dreams, of photography, of cinema, of the way of dressing, of cooking. 
In order to create a culinary “dish” for instance, we must select the 
ingredients, manipulate them by following a recipe, that is a “narrative 
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plan” organised in sequences, appraise one or another according to the 
situation, mix the flavours so that, at the moment of eating they are 
also capable of “telling” the procedure which has led to the creation of 
the dish itself. And even clothes, our mantle, the objects with which we 
cover ourselves, the signs that influence us or which decorate us are 
forms through which our bodies enter in relation with the world and 
between one another. Dressing in any society and culture is, therefore, 
a type of design, of simulation of the world, valid for society and for 
the individual, which is made in signs and objects through which the 
body is situated in time and in space in its surrounding environment. 
What articulates the way of dressing is a sort of socio-cultural syntax 
that we shall call “customs” within the ritual functions of clothes and 
of traditional societies, “fashion” in the context of the aesthetic 
functions of clothing and the culture of modernity. Despite being in 
different historical, social and geographical situations, human beings 
have always had a very particular relationship with the clothes, with 
the objects that they wear and with the “artificial” signs of the body, 
based on the conviction that internal relations between these elements 
and between this and the body are regulated by a judicious logic, 
whether it be collective or idiosyncratic. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962) 
made an exemplary description of this phenomenon, through the 
anthropological study of what he has called “patchwork”, that is the 
“savage” art of connecting objects apparently without common 
connections, but whose “collection” is, however, presented from the 
point of view of the subject who realises it, as an organised and 
homologous system compared to the “world”, as a language, as a 
“piece” of society materialised in objects, styles, rites, ways of 
appearing corporeal. 
A dish or some clothes, however, if they are “above all” signs in 
which the respective languages are articulated are also different from 
signs, they are “extra-sign residues” or “bodies”, as Rossi-Landi calls 
them (Rossi-Landi 1985: 137–166). Of a certain food we eat the “body”, 
apart from the sign, that is apart from what we have called “dish”. We 
cover ourselves with heavy clothes or with a pair of socks because they 
keep us warm, as well as for cultural, social, geographical and fashion 
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reasons. Basically, with non-verbal systems, or those made up of both 
verbal and non-verbal matter, there is also a non-sign dimension apart 
from the sign dimension that lets them be defined as “languages”. 
Verbal language is, however, entirely made up of sign material, 
articulated on a phonological, morphological, syntactical, semantic 
and pragmatic level. This explains why we use the term “linguaggio” — 
which, however, conceals a privileging of the aspect of the verbal — to 
indicate modelling procedures which can also be exerted on non-
verbal material: indeed the word “linguaggio” shows how much these 
procedures are manifested in the verbal better than in other fields. At 
the same time, the verbal method allows us to consider how societies 
that have privileged other modelling systems can exist, as the other 
modelling systems (for instance, clothing, music, gifts) are in any case 
homologous to what the linguistic verbal system represents for 
societies and cultures which basically articulate the production and 





The sign dimension of the social has characterised the history of 
cultures and civilisations: to support this just think of the totally sign 
nature of natural languages and thus of the socio-linguistic categories 
under them, or of the symbolic function of non-verbal sign systems 
like food and clothing. Sign systems show their operating mechanisms 
like motors of relations between individuals, like modelling devices of 
the world, like principles of meanings and of values. In this sense the 
sign systems can be defined as communication systems. In his Scheme 
of social reproduction (Rossi-Landi 1985: 27–45), Rossi-Landi defines 
communication as social reproduction, that means as the whole 
situation of production-exchange-consumption of goods and of 
messages, which he considers all signs in his “homology model”. It is 
not only the moment of exchange — which would appear to be the 
most naturally exposed to this — that assumes the communicative 
dimension (which is expressed for instance in aspects like advertising 
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persuasion techniques, marketing strategies, etc.), but also the other 
two, production and consumption. This becomes evident above all in 
the present time, whatever it may be called: “post-industrial”, “post-
Fordist” etc. Indeed, the manifestations of sign production-communi-
cation range from the telecommunications, IT, cinema, remote work 
industries to processes of automation and training; consumption as 
communication includes elements like the consumption of telephone, 
electricity, IT, television, “satellite”, etc. and should also be considered 
in the light of its so-called “fluidation”, that is its mobility, flexibility, 
hybridation.  
Production, exchange and consumption are currently three 
moments which are now almost completely intersecting one another. 
Their structural similarity, which establishes a homology inside social 
reproduction itself, is already hidden in Rossi-Landi’s reflections, 
particularly on the level that Rossi-Landi calls “global production” 
(Rossi-Landi 1985: 82–84). This concerns the fact that a given explicit 
artefact, whether it be verbal or non-verbal, “tells” so as to say, shows 
the productive totality that generated it, for instance a language, a 
material culture, mankind as a whole. Many signs-goods of our pre-
sent explicate globalised social reproduction from which they were 
produced, within which they exchange and consume themselves: from 
jeans, to Coca-Cola, to IT writing to credit cards. The main socio-
semiotic feature of these signs-goods is that of containing in them-
selves a communicative value, to be communication alone, both as 
sign-goods produced and in sign-goods exchanged and consumed.  
The blend of goods and signs, proposed since the 1960’s by Rossi-
Landi, means that the value of goods is above all considered as a social 
relation. This relation now implies that the value of an object consists 
not so much of its functionality — of its value of use — and not even 
of its exchange value intended in the traditional sense. In the current 
period which can be defined as the period of total communication, the 
value can be intended as being the communicative value whose mea-
sure is above all based on innovation and speed.  
The concept of innovation is much less hazardous than what we 
might think: indeed it concerns the generalised sign quality of social 
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reproduction, as various recent projects have shown, amongst which 
we can point out here the Green paper on innovation of the European 
Commission. A creative process, a service, a research, a development 
programme, an object, can be called “innovative” firstly from a com-
municative perspective, since innovation must be socially represented 
as such, it must be based on social discourses which circulate and 
which are reproduced both inside restricted groups (for instance a 
company, a public commission, a government), and within extended 
communities on mass levels. In this sense the truthfulness of the social 
discourse which supports innovation, depends on the capacity that 
this discourse has for circulating “as if” it were true, to respond to 
expectations and removed meanings, to construct styles of life, to 
interact with other discourses.  
Moreover, paradoxically and paraphrasing an expression of 
Benjamin (1995), regarding innovation, we can talk about its semiotic 
destructive character, that is about the fact that the impossibility to use 
a means of production or a consumption good concerns its wear as a 
sign and not as a “body” (Rossi-Landi 1985: 137–166). Indeed “scrap-
ping” the old and replacing it with the “latest innovation” occurs in 
every phase of social reproduction as a result of communicative tech-
niques which, to the detriment of the so-called “old”, exploit totally 
sign elements, like modularity, speed, design, “virtualisation”, perso-
nalisation. Boundless examples with direct reference to the present can 
be made to support this: from the philosophy itself that regulates the 
idea of software; to the role of design in the car industry, of hi-fi and 
household electrical items, to the concepts of time, space and body 




8. Open sociosemiotics 
 
It has been previously demonstrated how language is an intrinsically 
social factor, it is society tout court: an important consequence of this 
arrangement is that, however and wherever sociolinguistics as a 
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science of language may direct its research, it cannot help taking into 
consideration fundamentally the manner, the procedure, the forms 
through which the social relations are modelled and take shape in 
language. Differences, roles, hierarchies, are some of the forms that 
social relations assume when they are modelled by language.  
The  key concepts of “official” sociolinguistics until now, like for 
instance “variability” and “linguistic variation”, “communicative si-
tuation”, “linguistic community”, cannot therefore refer only to lan-
guage as a “downstream” product of the linguistic production process, 
but should basically be put in relation with the whole meaning 
generating procedure  called “language”. When linguistic systems, like 
for instance a natural language are considered “products”, then it will 
be important to point out how much these systems manage to “say” 
about their production and generation processes, and of their ope-
ration as motors of social relations. For instance, if a natural language 
is to be examined from the point of view of sexual difference, the 
“empirical” analysis of the texts, of grammatical and syntactical 
structures, of lexemes, must be supported by theoretical analysis of the 
procedures of social discourse through which those constructs have 
been produced and forms by means of which they model the order of 
the social discourse itself.  
The concept of “plurilinguism” is central in this vision, inasmuch 
as it is intended not principally as plurilinguism of “lingue” (in the line 
that has until now inspired the analysis of bilinguism, of diglossia, of 
sectorial languages, of dialects, of registers, etc., as “flagship” areas of 
socio-linguistics), but as pluriliguism of “linguaggi”, of types of dis-
course (pluridiscoursiveness), of voices (polyphony), which acts as a 
condition of possibility in all the manifestations of lingua, including 
those indicated above. 
However, there is another important element to underline. If 
language is considered to include verbal and non verbal material, the 
meaning production processes are to be considered in different areas, 
which can indeed see verbal language as that in which social relations 
are defined in a more macroscopic and significant manner, but which 
must also consider the field of non-verbal languages. In this sense, 
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socio-linguistics is intended as being socio-semiotics, without preju-
dice to the fact that the reference area must be human, since semiotics 
also has the prerogative of referring to the world of non-human vital 
signs.  
The fact that socio-linguistics as an independent science of lan-
guage was also created as a reasonably explicit echo of those political, 
cultural and social movements that had the merit of introducing a 
radical cultural relativism around the 1960’s, certifies its occasionally 
critical function of all the supposed universalisms. This component of 
opening and stabilising in social practice also makes socio-linguistics 
in the sense of socio-semiotics a “frontier” science, in the dual sense 
that it is not only on the border between science of language and the 
anthropological and social sciences, but also that it can be constructed 
in a movement of continual “crossing frontiers” and of “conta-
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Язык в процессе социальной репродукции: социолингвистика 
и социосемиотика 
 
В статье рассматриваются семиотические основы социолингвистики. 
Начиная с определения термина «социолингвистика» философом 
Адамом Шаффом, статья сосредоточивается на понятии «крити-
ческой социолингвистики» итальянского семиотика Росси-Ланди. 
Основа социального измерения языка кроется, по мнению Росси-
Ланди, в феномене «социального воспроизводства», которое охва-
тывает как вербальные, так и невербальные знаки. Судя по 
соссюровскому «Курсу общей лингвистики» и по его гарвардским 
рукописям, его термин langue можно рассматривать именно в таком 
контексте. 
Далее в статье предпринимается попытка разъяснить провока-
тивное определение Роланом Бартом «семиологии» как части линг-
вистики (а не наоборот!) и развить с этой точки зрения понятие 
производства коммуникации. Статьи Романа Якобсона 1960-х гг. 
позволяют нам рассматривать в социосемиотическом (как это сейчас 
называется) ключе превращение знаков «органического» типа в 
знаки нового типа, в которых соотносятся органическое и инстру-
ментальное. Исходя из этого, цель социолингвистики — быть преж-
де всего социосемиотикой, т.к. семиотика не ограничивает себя расс-
мотрением исключительно человеческих знаков.  
Социолингвистика в качестве социосемиотики берет на себя роль 
«пограничной науки» в двух смыслах: как по той причине, что она 
служит границей между наукой о языке и гуманитарными и социаль-
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ными науками, так  и по той, что она конструируется в ходе постоян-




Keel sotsiaalses taastootmises: sotsiolingvistika ja sotsiosemiootika 
 
Käesolev artikkel räägib sotsioligvistika semiootilistest alustest. Artikkel 
alustab termini “sotsiolingvistika” määratlusest filosoof Adam Schaffi 
poolt ja keskendub itaalia semiootiku Rossi-Landi “kriitilise sotsio-
lingvistika” mõistele. Keele sotsiaalse dimensiooni alus peitub Rossi-Landi 
poolt “sotsiaalseks taastootmiseks” nimetatud fenomenis, mis hõlmab nii 
verbaalseid kui mitteverbaalseid märke. Saussure’i Cours de linguistique 
générale, aga ka tema Harvardi käsikirjade põhjal otsustades võib ta 
terminit langue just selles võtmes mõista.  
Edasi üritatakse artiklis mõtestada Roland Barthes’i poolt üsna  provo-
katiivselt defineeritud “semioloogiat” kui osa keeleteadusest (ja mitte vastu-
pidi!) ning arendada sellest vaatepunktist lähtudes kommunikatsiooni-
tootmise mõistet. Roman Jakobsoni 1960ndatest pärit artiklid võimal-
davad meil sotsiosemiootiliselt (nagu seda praegu nimetatakse) käsitleda 
“orgaaniliste” märkide muundumist uut tüüpi märkideks, milles suhes-
tuvad orgaaniline ja instrumentaalne. Sellest vaimust kantuna oleks 
sotsiolingvistika eesmärk olla ennekõike sotsiosemiootika, ilma et eelda-
taks kitsalt vaid inimestega tegelemist, kuivõrd semiootika privileegiks on 
see, et tegeletakse ka mitte-inimlike märkidega.  
Sotsiosemiootiline lingvistika võtab endale “piirteaduse” rolli kahes 
mõttes: ühelt poolt kui piir täppisteaduste keele ja humanitaar- ning 
sotsiaalteaduste vahel, aga teiselt poolt moodustub sotsiolingvistika pideva 
“piiride ületamise” ja keelte ning teadusvaldkondade vahelise vastastikuse 
“segunemise” kaudu. 
 
 
